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ABSTRACT 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 has the underlying social policy objective of 
ensuring that New Zealand government and non-government organisations have 
high standards of corporate governance. The existence of non-corrupt and 
accountable agencies that operate efficiently and effectively will increase the 
well being of the country by ensuring that resources are fairly and equitably 
distributed . In terms of the employer - employee relationship, it also has the 
objective of providing protection for employees who disclose wrongdoing. 
However the writer believes that the achievement of these objectives is seriously 
undermined by jurisdictional and interpretative problems with the Act. A more 
focused statute, with effective limits on the nature of disclosures that qualify for 
protection, increased restrictions on the types of wrongdoings that can be 
disclosed, especially with regard to private sector organisations and finally more 
specific guidance as to circumstances when the protections of the Act are not 
available would have avoided many of the problems inherent with the Act in its 
current form . 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page and footnotes) comprises 
approximately 15300 words. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO 'WHISTLEBLOWING' 
Whistleblowing is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as the bringing of an 
activity to a short conclusion as if by the blast of a whistle. The term originates 
from when policemen blew their whistles to summon help to apprehend a 
criminal. However from a legal perspective, a more useful definition of 
whistleblowing as 1 
... <1 person nrnking <1 disclosure in bre<1ch of <1 confidenti<1l rel<1tionship, but 
which disclosure should, it is cl<1imed, be nevertheless treated <1s legitim<1te, 
and in reg<1rd to which, it is <1lso m<1 int<1 ined tlrnt he should be protected by l<1w 
from the ret<1li<1tory <1ction by the body employing him, which or who has 
t<1 ken objection to the <1ct of the whistleblowing. 
Whistleblowing occurs when that person, usually an employee, notifies some 
other person (usually in authority) of an activity being undertaken by an 
organisation or by some individual within an organisation which breaches the law 
or constitutes a risk to ' specific interests ' .2 This activity is customarily disclosed 
because the person is concerned to have the activity stopped or to have the 
conduct of the organisation or individual concerned remedied either by the 
organisation itself or by some external body. This concern is what motivates the 
whistleblower to act and the courts have recognised that in some situations it is 
also in the public interest to have the activity stopped. This public interest 
character of certain disclosures is what gives them legitimacy and distinguishes 
them from what otherwise would be illegitimate acts in which confidential 
information is disclosed in breach of implied obligations of fidelity and good faith 
owed to the employer. Underlying the judicial acknowledgement that disclosures 
of confidential information are justified in certain circumstances is recognition 
that the obligation every employee has as a corporate citizen3 to reveal 
"information that an employee reasonably believes is evidence of the 
1 JG St<1rke "The Protection of Public Sector Whistleblowers" (1991) 65 ALJ 205, 207. 
2 The Ministry of St<1te Services Report of the Ministerial Review on Whistleblowing (Wellington 
1995), 4; identifies these interests <1s "such <1s <1 risk to public he<1lth or public s<1fety, or to an 
individtml 's he<1Ith or S<1fety or the environment" 
3 See generally Gerald Vint en ·· lflhist/eb/0111ing- S'ubversion or corporate citizen'!" (St M<1rtins 
Press, New York, 199-l) 
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contravention of any law, rule, or regulation, code of practice, or professional 
statement, or that involves mismanagement, corruption, abuse of authority, or 
danger to public or worker health and safety"4 outweighs the obligations to and 
the rights of the employer. These are rights such as to protect confidential, 
seemingly private information,5 to expect fidelity from employees and for 
employees to always act in the best interests of the organisation. 6 
It follows that if it is in the public interest that the information be disclosed, that 
people who blow the whistle on such organisations need to be protected from the 
retaliatory acts of those organisations. Although there have been very few cases 
arising from such retaliation that have come before New Zealand courts, English 
cases reflect an essential problem with the protection provided by the common 
law, in that it only provides the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff 
Whistleblower cases have only come before the courts, when the employer has 
taken a retaliatory action such as dismissal of the whistleblower and the 
whistleblower has then brought the matter before the courts seeking relief Even 
if the whistleblower is successful, the consequences for the whistleblower have 
usually been substantial in terms of the whistleblower's career and future 
prospects .7 Accordingly, the rationale of any statutory based whistleblowing 
protection scheme is that it attempts to be the fence at the top of the cliff, 
prohibiting the retaliatory action before it happens. By removing the threat of 
retaliatory action by the employer, employees will be encouraged to step forward 
and disclose wrongdoings . 
However, it is important that any statutory protection scheme balances the need to 
provide protection for such whistleblowers against the rights of employers. 
Governments in many jurisdictions have enacted whistleblowing protection 
prov1s1ons that reveal different approaches to this dilemma. From specific 
legislation that allows a person who makes a claim that their employer is 
4 Yinten, above n 3, 5. 
5 see Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler 11987] Ch 117; f 1986] l All ER 617 which sets out the 
type of information which can be protected by an employer during and after employment. 
6 See also Companies Act 1993 s 131 that places a statutOI)' duty on directors to act in the best 
interests of the company. 
7 See generally Yinten, above n 3, 5 - 31 for selected case studies on the long-tenn effects on the 
career ofwhistleblowers in both the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
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defrauding the government to receive a share of the damages payable by the 
employer, 8 to provisions that apply only to disclosure by public sector 
employees,9 to broad-reaching statutes that apply to certain disclosures of all 
employees of both private and public sectors.10 It is this last approach that is 
reflected in New Zealand's recently enacted Protected Disclosures Act 2000 
(PDA). 
The previous Government in bringing the Protected Disclosures Bill before the 
House in 1996 signalled, as a matter of social policy, state recognition of the role 
that whistleblowers have in ensuring we live in a safe, crime free and non corrupt 
society, and hence the need for statutory protection of those who blow the whistle 
in the public interest. It is also reflects a belief that it is a legitimate function of 
government to promote ethical standards of behavior for both workers and 
management. As the Hon Paul East stated in the House when the Protected 
Disclosure Bill was reported back from Select Committee: 11 
.... [tjhe purpose of the Bill is .to establish a whistle-blower protection 
scheme that will promote the public interest by facilitating disclosure and 
investigation of matters of serious wrongdoing. Whistle-blowing protection 
schemes are designed to encourage and promote the expectation that 
employees will judge their own conduct as well as tJ1e conduct of others 
within that organisation by public interest standards and values. 
However while these policies are laudable, the protection scheme created by the 
Act, does not fully achieve these policy goals and leaves businesses and 
organisations in New Zealand exposed to the risk of confidential information 
being disclosed outside of the organisation, without any corresponding gain to 
society. Pait II of this paper outlines the background to the PDA and in Part III 
the writer considers the expectations and philosophies that have resulted in the 
statutory legitimacy now afforded to whistleblowing. It also suggests that ethical 
business practices will be achieved by a more holistic approach to business 
8 False Claims Act (US). This Act dates back to the civil war and offers L0-30 per cent of the 
renalty as bounty for the client clnd clttorney who successfully blow the whistle. 
The Protected Disclosures Act 199-l (NSW) 
10 Public Interests Disclosure Act 1988 (UK) 
11 (16 October 1997) NZPD, 4822. 
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operations, rather than simply regulating whistleblowing. Part IV introduces the 
basic structure of the Act including the stated purposes of the Act. In Part V the 
writer examines the Act in detail and argues that the PDA does not achieve a 
workable balance between protection for employees and the rights of employers, 
especially in the private sector. 
II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PROTECTED DISCLOSURES 
ACT 2000. 
The PDA is New Zealand's first specifically targeted legislation to protect 
whistleblowers. The background to the Act originates in 1994 when a 
whistleblowing disciplinary action was taken against a Mr Neil Pugmire, a 
psychiatric nurse, by his employer who alleged Mr Pugmire breached his 
obligation of confidentiality in disclosing information about the release of a 
patient in his employer's care. As a consequence of the public debate, the then 
member of the opposition, the Hon P Goff introduced a private members bill 
known as Whistleblowers Protection Bill. 
This Bill proposed that there be established a separate whistleblowing protection 
authority to receive information from employees and to investigate such 
disclosures. Subsequently in 1995 the Minister of State Services established a 
Ministerial Review to research the need for legislation in this area. The Review 
team found that there was no evidence that New Zealand did need an involved 
protection regime. For the Ministerial Review found only a low level of 
corruption in New Zealand and correspondingly only low incidents of 
whistleblowing and concluded, " there is certainly insufficient work to justify the 
establishment of new specialist agency". 12 Instead it recommended that the 
existing law be tightened up to protect employees in circumstances such as Mr 
Pugmire. These recommendations were three-fold. 13 Firstly to make any 
retaliatory action by an employer grounds for a personal grievance claim under 
the Employment Contracts Act 1991 . Secondly to provide a remedy for 
12 Ministeric1l Review, c1bove n2. 28 . 
13 Ministeric1l Review, c1bove 112, 27 . 
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victimisation under the Human Rights Act 1993 and lastly to provide statutory 
immunity from criminal or civil liability for individuals who use the appropriate 
procedures and make public interest disclosures . These recommendations were 
incorporated in the Protected Disclosures Bill 1996 14 (the Bill) that resulted from 
the report and have survived all the various versions of Bill to be the 
cornerstones of the protection provided in the PDA. 15 
The Bill was introduced in 1996 and referred to the Government Administration 
Select Committee. This Committee reported back in 1997 and recommended, in 
accord with the views of the majority of the Committee, that the Bill 16 which 
then covered all public sector and private sector employees, be limited to all 
public sector employees and only such private sector employees who were 
engaged to carry out some function of the public sector, for example, if a 
contractor were contracted to a public sector organisation. The stated rationale 
behind the exclusion of all other private sector employees was that if the 
proposed legislation included the private sector, this would be an erosion of 
important ' constitutional distinctions ' between public entities and private 
entities. Also it was viewed that there was a possibility of private sector 
employees using the Act to make baseless allegations about their employers and 
that as private sector organisations do not receive public funding or exercise 
public powers, it was recommended that the vast majority of private sector 
organisation should be excluded from the Act. 17 The amendments to the Bill as 
proposed by the majority of the Government Administration Committee were 
approved by the House of Representatives on 16 October 1997.18 
After the Second Reading in October J 997, progress of the Bill through 
Parliament stalled until the change in government in November 1999. In 2000 
following the introduction and debate on 28 March 2000 of a Supplementary 
Order Paper amending the Bill to include all private sector employees, the Third 
14 Protected Disclosures Act 1996, no 208- 1. 
15 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, ss 17, 18 and 25. 
16 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, no 208- 1 
17 Protected Disclosure Bill 1996, no 208-2, iv (the select commit1ee reports) 
18 The parties who voted in favour of the Select Committees recommendations were New Zealand 
National , New Zealand First; Alliance, ACT and United ·with 011.ly Labour voting against the 
amendments. 
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Reading followed on 29 March 2000 19 and was assented to 3 April 2000. The 
Act commences on 1 January 2001 . 
The present Government in extending the PDA to cover all private sector 
employees ignored the recommendations of the Select Committee. The reasons 
for this change are unclear, although one of the main proponents of the 
Supplementary Order Paper when the House in committee debated the matter 
was the Hon P Goff, the original champion of Neil Pugmire. The government 
appears to have discredited the Select Committee report as being too 
representative of certain interest groups such as the Business Roundtable. As 
Janet Mackey stated when the House debated the Supplementary Order Paper 
"the crowning glory of the Business Roundtable's submission was that it quoted 
at great length from the then Controller and Auditor General, Jeff Chapman20 in 
support of the fact that there was not much corruption and that this legislation 
should not cover the private sector" 21 This history of the private sector being 
included in the original Bill and then removed at the select committee stage and 
then included again by Supplementary Order paper, without wider consultation 
or review, may explain some of the substantial interpretative and jurisdictional 
difficulties that the writer believes are inherent in the Act in its current form . 
These difficulties are discussed in Part V of this paper. 
III PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWING - POLICY AND 
EXPECTATION 
A Introduction 
Few would question that freedom from corruption, from incompetence and from 
activities that place the public at risk are desirable social goals. For proponents 
of whistleblowing, it follows that the disclosing of situations that threaten these 
goals and place the public at risk should be encouraged and should be regarded 
as positive contributions to society. Indeed some have argued that people who 
19 The vote for the Third Reading of the Bill was a party vote and was passed witJ1 66 voting for 
the motion and 53 against. The Labour, Alliance and Green Parties voted in favour and New 
Zealand National , ACT, New Zealand First voted against. 
20 JcIT Chapman was subsequently dismissed from this position and also convicted for matters 
relating to fraud and dishonesty 
21 (28 March 2000) NZPD <http :/rangi . knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard 
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are aware of certain illegal activities are under a form of civic duty to notify an 
· h · 22 appropriate aut onty. In social policy theory, the protection of those who 
disclose wrongdoing, is based on a belief that if the agencies of the state and also 
private sector organisations operate ethically and effectively, this will increase 
the well-being of members of a society by ensuring that all members have fair 
and equitable access to the goods and resources of that society. The intervention 
of the state into the relationship between employer and employee, especially in 
the private sector, by providing statutory protection for employees who disclose 
wrongdoings, can also be seen in social policy terms as it affects the balance of 
power in that relationship . However for public and private sector organisations 
there are also specific policy considerations as discussed below. 
B. Public Sector Organi.mtions 
Certainly with regard to public sector organisations in New Zealand, there has 
been in the last thirty years an increasing importance placed on the accountability 
of such organisations. Institutions of government can now legitimately be the 
subject of scrutiny and can be called upon to justify their actions and decisions. 
The establishment of offices such as the Commissioner for Children, the Health 
and Disability Commissioner, the enactment of the Privacy Act 1993, and the 
establishment of the Serious Fraud Office have collectively provided a check on 
excesses of institutions of government and also created an expectation that 
concerns raised by the public will be subject of independent scrutiny. These 
agencies as well as the State Services Commissioner and the Controller and 
Auditor-General play a role in check in ensuring that government agencies fulfil 
their statutory responsibilities. In probably the most significant innovation, the 
establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman "has been successfully adopted 
and implemented in the New Zealand Government environment to ensure that 
those who believe they have cause to complain about the performance of the of 
the Institutions of State can have those concerns assessed by independent persons 
22 See RT De George Uusiness Ethics (3"1 cd, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1990) 
211-214. 
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of the highest personal credibility". 23 
Encouraging whistleblowing in the public sector by ensuring adequate protection 
of whistleblowers can be justified in a society that is moving towards a culture of 
openness and accountability in the operation of its government agencies. In fact, 
the Ministerial Review which investigated the need for statutory whistleblowing 
protection in New Zealand, reported that some of the people had indicated a 
belief that as a result of public sector restructuring of the last decade, this had led 
to an increased need for such protection. For these changes were seen to have 
reduced the status and function of traditional control agencies, as well as placing 
emphasis on financial outcomes and the achievement of defined outcomes and 
accordingly there was now even more justification for the implementation of a 
whistleblowing protection procedure to ensure unacceptable risks and practices 
do not become established in public sector institutions.24 The recent disclosure 
of the high incidence of cervical cancer in certain parts of New Zealand, due in 
part to alleged inadequate supervision and management of those involved in the 
screening process as a result of the continual process of restructuring the health 
sector in the last decade, supports these submissions. 
The need to ensure that state sector agencies, especially those involved in social 
services, health and education, deliver and continue to deliver effective and 
responsive services is in the interests of all New Zealanders. Gross 
mismanagement or the misuse of funds in the public sector, but especially in 
these areas directly affects the delivery of services and will likely disadvantage 
certain groups from access to the resources of our society. It may also reduce the 
likelihood of the achievement of social goals by such agencies and accordingly 
whistleblowing as one method to ensure gross mismanagement or corruption is 
exposed, is therefore justified in the public interest. This, it has been suggested, 
is especially the case for employees of governmental agencies as they have 
obligations not only as employees, but also as citizens. For the25 
23 Ministerial Review, above n 2, 2. 
24 Ministerial Review, above n 2, 3. 
25 RT De George, above n 22, 201-202 
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. . . obligations one has to one ' s government are considerably different 
from obligations to nongovernmental employers. The reason is that 
government employees arc related to their government both as citizens 
and as employees and the harm done by governmental employees may 
have effects not only on the particular division in which tJ1ey are 
employed but also on tJ1e govenunent and tJ1e country as whole. 
Thus the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 can be viewed as statutory measure to 
ensure that the social policy objectives of government agencies are achieved. 
However the writer believes that it is not possible to make such a clear 
distinction between the civic responsibilities of public and private sector 
employees. Employees of privately run hospitals or privately owned public 
transport businesses that know that health or safety standards are not being 
maintained , face the same moral dilemma as their public sector counterparts. 
C Private Sector Organisations 
One of the foundations of the PDA is that first level disclosure of any alleged 
wrongdoing is required under the Act, except in limited circumstances, to be 
inside the organisation. This ensures that if adequate systems are in place, the 
wrongdoing can be addressed internally and without publicity . Thus the PDA 
encourages whistleblowing, but controls it by channelling the information 
through pre-stated guidelines. To " institutionalize and internalize 
whistleblowing" 26has been described by one commentator critical of 
whistleblowing as the best approach to controlling it .27 . It is therefore surprising 
that there has been and continues to be a high level of resistance from the private 
sector to the PDA. The Employer' s Federation was repo11ed as stating when the 
Bill was passed ; " [s]ome provisions of the Protected Disclosures Act could allow 
a disaffected employee, motivated by malice, to cause create damage to a 
business". 28 The alleged costs of compliance with the new Act have also been 
publicised and used by those opposing the current government as further 
evidence that it is against business in New Zealand .29 In fact under the PDA, 
26 Yinten, above n 3, 13 . 
27 See generally Vintcn, above n 3. 
28
" Bill irks employees" The Press. Christchurch, New Zealand, 3 1 March 31 2000, 3. 29 Editorial , The Dominion. Wellington, New Zealand, 17 Aug 2000, JO . -
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private sector organisations have the option of establishing internal procedures, 
which are not mandatory, as is the case for public sector organisations. Although 
as the writer discusses later, those organisations that do adopt such procedures 
may in fact benefit. Private sector organisations should consider undertaking a 
cost-benefit analysis of the costs of establishing, promoting and publicising such 
procedures against the potential costs to the reputation of that organisation if the 
public become aware of some wrongdoing by that organisation. It is also been 
alleged that it will introduce a new era of uncertainty into the employee -
employer relationship in light of the references to the Human Rights Act and 
creates uncertainty in terms of the employer's obligations under other legislation, 
such as the Privacy Act 1993 and will lead to more litigation between employers 
and employees. Thus the decision to include all private sector organisations 
within the PDA is one that is not fully supported , although the extent of the real 
opposition to this decision is difficult at this stage to determine. There have 
recently been some suggestions that New Zealand businesses are increasingly 
recognising the importance of business ethics at an operational level. In the 
February edition of Management magazine, Ian F Grant argues that business 
ethics in New Zealand are now given more credence than ten years ago . His 
evidence included that new Centre for Business Ethics at the Auckland 
University of Technology and the setting up New Zealand Businesses for Social 
Responsibility and Business Ethics category at the Top 200 awards. He quotes 
Gael McDonald, Professor of Business Ethics at UNITEC Institute of 
Technology in Auckland as stating there has been a "sea change in the attitude of 
many companies. ' I think there ' s a greater realisation of the power of consumer 
opinion and the fragility of reputations, an example being the Cooper Creek wine 
business, and companies are now wanting to talk about how to avoid these sort of 
situations' ''.3° 
The terms of reference of the 1995 Ministerial Review31 included that 
consideration needed to be given to the issue of the inclusion of the private sector 
in any statutory scheme. This Review found there was no consensus on this 
30 Ian F Grant "Keepers of the Corporate Soul" ( L 999) -n /I Mrurngement (Profile Publishing 
Aucklc111d) 28. 
31 Ministerial Review, above n 2. 
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issue from the people consulted or interviewed. However it was clear that none 
of the private sector representatives were in favour of a separate new agency to 
investigate alleged whistleblowing, which was originally proposed in the private 
members Whistleblowing Protection Bill. 32 The Review concluded to exclude the 
private sector from the legislation would be to "send the wrong message to 
potential public interest disclosers in the private sector, and to their employers" .33 
Further the review stated that "given the nature of the interests at issue, we do not 
think it is logical to limit the availability of remedies on the basis of the sector in 
which an employee works . For example serious malpractice is a proper matter of 
public interest whether it occurs in a private or public hospital". 34 The decision 
by the current government to include the private sector within the statutory 
regime reflects these findings .35 
However the decision to extend the Act to the private sector also reflects a 
political view that there needs to be a cultural change in favour of people 
speaking out in all organisations.36 The current Government rejected limiting the 
PDA to the public sector because it was claimed that it would be seen as an 
indicator that the Government expects different standards of ethical behaviour 
from the private and public sectors. Further rhetoric that "it [is] a responsibility 
of central government to provide clear leadership to give people the courage to 
raise issues that are of concern in their work place, regardless of whether it is in 
the public sector or the private sector"37 was offered as justification for the 
change to the Bill. However moral justifications of whistleblowing aside, from a 
social policy perspective the intervention of government to ensure protection for 
those who blow the whistle on private sector employers, in terms of ensuring that 
such employees are not disadvantaged by their whistleblowing activities, is 
significant. 
32 Ministerial Review, above 11 2, 11 
33 Ministerial Review, above 11 2, 12. 
34 Ministerial Review, above 11 2, 12. 
35 Bui sec Ministerial Review, above n 2, 13 where the Review Team did suggest that tJ1e nrnge 
of matters that might be subject to disclosure in the private sector should be more limited that in 
tJ1e public sector in recognition of the private sector's right to order its own affairs in certain 
areas. 
36 The Hon Phil Goff, (28 March 2000) NZPD <http:/rangi. knowledge-basket.co.nzfhansard 37 Ruth Dyson, (28 March 2000) NZPD <htlp:/rangi . knowlcdgc-basket .co.nz/hansard 
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D. Whist/eh/owing Procedures . 
1. Code cl Practice 
It is the writer's view that although private sector employers may view the new 
legislation with a great deal of scepticism and as just another statute placing 
unnecessary obligations on businesses, companies that do adopt internal 
procedures and encourage a culture of openness of communication and trust will 
benefit. The institutionalising and internalising of employees' concerns by 
establishing effective internal channels for dealing with such concerns lessens the 
likelihood of those employees exposing the information externally. 
Wrongdoings are more likely to be dealt with efficiently, internally and most 
importantly without publicity. Further if internal procedures include codes of 
practice for whistleblowers, this may encourage employees to carefully consider 
their potential actions before they blow the whistle outside of the organisation . 
Codes of Practice have been developed by various writers in the area of business 
ethics . Such codes usually take the form of a series of questions or justifications 
that a potential whistleblower should consider in order to ensure that their actions 
are morally justifiable. For example Valasquez suggests a potential external 
whistleblower consider the following: 38 
l . There is clem, substantial and reasonably comprehensive evidence that 
the organization is engaged in some activity that is seriously wronging 
or will seriously wrong other parties. 
2. Reasonably serious attempts to prevent the wrong through intemaJ 
whistlcblowing have been tried and have failed. 
3. It is reasonably certain that e;...1emal whistleblowing will prevent the 
wrong. 
4 . The wrong is serious enough to justify the injuries that external 
whistleblowing will probably. i11!lict in oneself, one 's family and other 
parties. 
While having such guidelines in place, will not screen out all unjustifiable 
external whistleblowing activities, it may reduce such disclosures. 
38 MG Velasquez Business E1hics-concepts and cases (3'd ed, Prentice Hall , New Jersey, 1992) 403. 
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2. Organisational culture. 
However it is essential to the success of such procedures that they are 
implemented as one component of an overall ethical business philosophy. Good 
standards of corporate governance will not be solely achieved by the introduction 
of such a code implemented within the framework of the PDA. In fact as one 
writer states "whistleblowing is a symptom of an organisation that is, in some 
way out of control" .39 Robert De George, a writer on business ethics, suggests 
that need for moral heroes, being those who through a sense of moral obligation 
blow the whistle on their employers, shows the existence of a defective 
corporation. He continues, "it is more important to change the legal and 
corporate structures that make whistleblowing necessary than to convince people 
to be moral heroes" .4° For the best way to prevent whistleblowing is to ensure 
that the entire organisation shares and maintains ethical values. While it is 
recognised that there are no simple solutions to ensuring such an ethos is actually 
practised by an organisation, one suggestion is for the board of directors of a 
company to establish a clear expectation with the company's Chief Executive 
Officer, that it does not want any surprises and wants advance warning of bad 
news. "Meeting this expectation then becomes one of the objectives reviewed in 
the CEO' s annual performance evaluation". 41 
3. Comn111nication outside of existing management structure. 
Ideally there should be sufficient trust and support within an organisation, that if 
an employee does have concerns about wrongdoings, there can be open 
communication of these. However in reality, whistleblowers often wish to and 
feel they must disclose anonymously or confidentially within an organisation. 
Under the PDA an organisation is required to ensure the confidentiality of the 
discloser.42 Whatever procedure is implemented, it should be outside of the 
existing management hierarchy, either to someone who has the power to 
investigate the matter or directly to the head of the organisation itself In either 
situation the disclosure of concerns operates as a safety valve as a line of 
39 Peter Jackson , " Whistles and Safety Valves" ( 1999) 122/3 CA Magazine (Toronto Canada) 44 40 De George, above n 22, 21-l 
41 Jackson , above 1139, 44 
42 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 19. 
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communication from employees straight to the top.43 It is essential that if an 
organisation implements a procedure for disclosing concerns inside of the 
organisation, that this is accepted and promoted as part of the culture of the 
organisation, instead of something that is set up to pay lip service to the concept. 
There have been many examples in New Zealand and the United Kingdom where 
tragedy could have been averted if the management did not have "closed ears" to 
the concerns of employees that safety issues were being ignored .44 
Reference can also be made to codes of ethics that many businesses have adopted 
in recent years . In 1998 the Institute of Business Ethics in Britain surveyed 178 
of Britains top 500 companies and found that more than half of the companies 
surveyed had a code of conduct on ethics, but in practice its content was 
unknown to staff, customers and other stakeholders . Thirty percent of those 
surveyed failed to give a copy of the code to staff 45 Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that if such research were undertaken in New Zealand, similar results would be 
obtained . Many businesses in New Zealand have adopted, as part of their 
internal business structures, a code of ethics that sets out the ethical base lines for 
the organisation. However for many organisations these codes tend to languish 
unnoticed by employees and management alike. Employees are not aware of the 
code or the pathways available if the code is not met. Education and the 
involvement of the work force require a commitment by management, otherwise 
the potential of internal whistleblowing as an internal corporate safety net may 
suffer the same fate. 
As discussed there is an apparent belief that the PDA will have a negative impact 
on private sector businesses in terms of compliance costs and the imposition of 
further procedural requirements on management. Paradoxically it is only 
43 Peter Jackson, <1bove n 39, 4-L 
44 In 1987, <1 cm ferry , Herald of Free Enterprise, s<1nk off the co<1 st of Belgium, resulting in tlie loss if 193 lives. The subsequent inquiry found tlrnt on five occ<1sions, staff had w<1rned m<1n<1gement about ferries sailing with the bow doors still open <lfter loading. In New Ze<1land the inquiry into the accident to Morgan Jones, a passenger on <1 Co<1st <1 l Pacific Train tlrnt fell after a hm1drnil between c<1rriages became unhooked. In the subsequent inquiry st<1II s<1id they Irnd told of their concerns to m<1nagement and had been ignored. 45 Sus<1n Mayne "Whistleblowing-Protection at last" (1999) I 0/ 11 ICCLR 325. 327 
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organisations that have nothing to hide, that may legitimately be able to complain 
about compliance costs and government interference in business. 
IV THE ACT- PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE 
A. Protection of the Whistleblower 
The Act has a stated two-fold purpose. 46 First it is to protect people who disclose 
serious wrongdoings. 47 This is achieved by the inclusion of the cornerstone 
protection provisions referred to above . However although the Act will establish 
legal protection for persons who make public interest disclosures, the 
consequences for a whistleblower within a workplace can be devastating in other 
ways. This arises from the common perception the act of whistleblowing is a 
betrayal, that starts in the school playground with people who tell tales being 
labelled 'snitches' or people who 'rat' on their friends . Often people who know 
of some wrongdoing do not disclose it or do so anonymously, not only through 
fear of losing their jobs or some other retaliatory action by their employer, but 
also due to this attitude that one does not ' shop ' one ' s colleagues. Accordingly 
protecting people who blow the whistle may reduce the legal consequences of 
dismissal or other retaliatory act by the employer, but is unlikely to reduce the 
hostility of other workers, unless there is overall a change in attitude. Therefore 
promotion of whistleblowing needs to occur as well as protection . 
B Promotion of Whist/eh/owing 
This fact is recognised by including a second purpose to the Act of encouraging 
and promoting in the public interest the disclosure of serious wrongdoing. As 
discussed above, to encourage employees to speak out will require to some 
extent an entire cultural change and it is difficult to change attitudes by 
legislation. Under the PDA public sector organisations are required to promote 
disclosure by establishing procedures whereby employees can disclose their 
concerns, although for the Act to be effective, all organisations need to ensure 
employee concerns are taken seriously. As stated there is substantial evidence 
46 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 5. 
47 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. s 5(b). 
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available of incidents when employees have reported concerns about safety 
issues that have been lost in middle management or have simply been ignored. 48 
If an organisation is to have effective and accepted channels for disclosure; this 
is more likely to happen as part of an organisation with high standards of ethical 
management. This is not going to be achieved by whistleblowing procedures 
alone. 
The PDA, in line with other whistleblowing protection legislation in other 
countries, promotes whistleblowing by setting out clear guidelines for a potential 
whistleblower in order for that person to be able to determine, before they blow 
the whistle, the likely legal consequences of their actions. This is in contrast to a 
whistleblower's position under the common law. Currently if an employee 
blows the whistle on an employer, the consequences for the employee will 
depend on firstly if the employer implements any retaliatory action and secondly 
if the particular disclosure is accepted by the courts as one that is in the public 
interest, then the employee may be able to obtain relief from such retaliation. 
Under a statutory scheme, a whistleblower should be able to minimise the 
potential uncertainty caused by the disclosure, at least in terms of the legal 
consequences, by choosing to do so using the predetermined statutory procedure. 
Whether the PDA achieves this certainty is examined in Part V of this paper. 
C. Procedures of the Protected Disclosures Act 2000. 
The PDA provides that an employee49 of an organisation, being defined as a 
body or persons compromising one employer and one or more employees, 50 may 
make a protected disclosures about serious wrongdoing in or by that 
organisation. 
48 See above n 4-l. 
49 Protected Disclosures Act s3 defines an employee of an organisation as including a former employee, a home worker. a person seconded to the organisation. any person under a contract for services working for the organisation, management and finally with relation to New Zealand 's Defence Forces, any member of the armed forces . 
50 Protected Disclosures Act s3 defines "organisation" as a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, and whether in the public sector or in the private sector: and includes a body of persons comprising I employer and I or more employees. 
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As stated initial or first level disclosure must be made internally within the 
organisation and must be made in accordance with internal procedures 
established by and published by that organisation. Only public sector 
organisations51 are required to have internal procedures in operation. Employees 
disclose to the head or deputy head of the organisation if there are no internal 
procedures in place. 
If the employee believes that the head of the organisation is involved or on the 
basis of urgency or some other exceptional circumstance or if the employee has 
already disclosed within the organisation and no action has resulted within 20 
days, 52 then the employee can disclose at the second level. This is disclosure 
outside of the organisation to "appropriate authorities". 53 Appropriate authorities 
are the heads of various public sector organisations. 
The PDA also provides a third level of disclosure .54 This is when an employee 
has made a first or second level disclosure and the employee believes that on 
reasonable grounds that the matter will not be investigated or will not be 
investigated within a reasonable time or if the matter is investigated that no 
action will result and the employee continues to believe that the information 
disclosed is true or likely to be true. Disclosure at the third level is to a Minister 
of the Crown or to the Ombudsman. 
For information to be protected by the PDA it must be about a ' serious 
wrongdoing' as that term is defined and also must satisfy certain requirements 
such as the employee believes the information to be true or likely to be true .55 If 
all these requirements are met, then the discloser is protected from any personal 
grievance action from the employer56 and also given immunity from criminal and 
civil proceedings. 57 
51 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s3 . 
52 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s9. 
53 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s9 (I) . 
54 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s l 0. 
55 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 6. 
56 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s17. 
57 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 18. 
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Employees can of course still disclose outside the boundaries of the Act, for 
example direct to the media or to politicians but then the protection provided by 
the Act would not be available. 
Finally the 1995 Ministerial Review considered that the term 'whistleblowing' 
has a pejorative context and instead preferred to use the phrase "public interest 
disclosure" 58 to describe this activity. While the writer does not necessarily 
agree with this view, the writer uses the term 'qualifying disclosure' to describe a 
disclosure of information in accord with the PDA. The word 'whistleblowing is 
used to describe the activity generally. 
V APPLIL""'ATION OF THE ACT-ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION 
A. Who is protected by the Act? 
The meaning of 'employee' is central to the operation of the PDA as the statutory 
protection of the Act is only afforded to 'employees'. The definition in the Act 
extends the ordinary meaning of ' employee ' to include former employees; 
homeworkers as that term is defined in the Employment Contracts Act 1991; 
contractors and persons on secondment; persons involved in the management of 
an organisation and military personnel. Before discussing these extended 
meanings, it is worth considering the ordinary meaning of 'employee'. In the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, an employee is stated as 
(a) me::ms any person of any age employed by an employer to do any work for hire or 
reward; and 
(b) includes---
(i) a homeworker: or a 
(ii) A person intending to work 
58 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. s6(2) 
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The essential element of this definition is that a person must be employed for hire 
or reward . A similar definition can be found in the State Sector Act 1988. It 
provides that an employee is a person who is "paid by salary, wages, or 
otherwise ... " 59 The definition was the subject of judicial comment in NZEI v 
Director General of Education. 60 The Court of Appeal stated that an employee is 
someone who performs services in return for consideration and therefore a 
trainee teacher was not an employee under the State Sector Act 1988. The courts 
took a similar approach to the status of an unpaid worker under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, when it held that a worker who received no wages for her 
employment in a shop, but received bed and board and had an expectation of a 
share in the business was not an employee.6 1 This issue has now been clarified 
by definition of ' employee' in the Employment Relations Act 2000, which 
commences on 2 October 2000. For a volunteer who does not expect to be 
rewarded for work to be performed as a volunteer and receives no reward for that 
work is specifically excluded from the statutory definition of ' employee '. 62 
Therefore if a person is a volunteer or works for the organisation in an unpaid 
capacity, that person is unlikely to receive the protection of the PDA in 
whistleblowing situation . While on policy grounds as volunteers do not receive 
payment, it is justifiable that they are unable to bring personal grievance actions, 
however the fact that volunteers will not receive immunity from prosecution is 
less defensible. If a volunteer discloses information that satisfies all criteria for a 
protected disclosure under the PDA, then it is inequitable that a volunteer could 
be sued for defamation or breach of confidence, but a person who is in paid 
employment who revealed the same information would be immune from 
prosecution . It is arguable that volunteers should be treated like former 
employees who are expressly stated to be employees for the purposes of the Act. 
Although the ability of a former employee to bring a personal grievance on the 
grounds of a former employer' s retaliatory act is specifically provided for in the 
Act, in reality the circumstances in which a former employer could retaliate are 
59 State Sector Act 1988 s2 . 
60 NZEI v Director-Genera/ of Education 11981] I NZLR 538(CA) 61 Jv!acCiillivray vJones 11992] 2 ERNZ 382 
62 Employment Relations Act 2000, s6. 
19 
limited. However the immunity from prosecution and protection from 
victimisation provisions will be important to protect former employees from 
other forms of retaliation and it is unjust that these protections are not available 
for volunteers. A similar argument may face non executive directors of private 
sector businesses who may not fall within the general definition of employee for 
this reason, although a non-executive director as someone arguably concerned in 
the management of the organisation, may be covered by the extended definition 
of 'employee' in the PDA. 
As stated an employee under the PDA in relation to an organisation also includes 
a person who is seconded to the organisation, and an individual ' engaged or 
contracted under a contract for services to do work for the organisation '. This 
clearly covers contractors who are engaged to work for an organisation from time 
to time. However the section does not specifically require that the contract for 
services has to be one directly with the organisation . The question that arises is 
whether someone like an auditor or a legal adviser who is employed by an 
independent firm that is contracted to provide auditing or legal services to the 
organisation would also fall within the definition in the PDA. Arguably the work 
done is only indirectly for the organisation as that person ' s primary duty is to 
work for the employer, namely the specific audit or legal firm . This may need to 
be clarified in the contract between the organisation and the employer. 
Finally a homeworker is defined in the Employment Contracts Act 1991 as 
including someone who is engaged, employed or contracted to do work for 
another person in a dwellinghouse. The definition of homeworker in the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 maintains this definition . 
B Information about what kind of activity may he disclosed? 
1. Serious Wrongdoing- the definition 
Before a disclosure qualifies for protection under the PDA, the disclosed 
information must relate to a 'serious wrongdoing' . The PDA provides :63 
63 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. sJ. 
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serious wrongdoing includes any serious wrongdoing of any of the following types: 
(a) an unlawful , corrnpt, or irregular use of public funds or any public 
resources; or 
(b) an act, omission, or course of conduct tl1at constitutes a serious risk 
to public health or public safety of the environment; or 
(c) an act, omission, or course of conduct that constjtutes a serious risk 
to the maintenance of law, including the prevention, investigation, 
and detection of offences and the right to a fair trial ; or 
(d) an act, omission, or course of conduct that constitutes an offence; or 
(e) an act, omission of course of conduct by a public official that is 
oppressive, improperly discriminatory, or grossly negligent , or that 
constitutes gross mismanagement, --
whether the wrongdoing occurs before or after the commencement of this Act 
The definition therefore encompasses a wide range of circumstances applying to 
most wrongful acts that whistleblowers have disclosed in the past. Generally, 
there is no requirement that the information about the malpractice be confidential 
although this will be the case in most situations. More significantly there is no 
requirement that the wrongful activity is against the public good and 
correspondingly that disclosure, especially when it is outside of the organisation, 
is in the public interest. This omission significantly widens the types of 
information that will be protected by the Act. 
2. Public Sector Activities- misuse qff,mds·, improper or negligent conduct. 
Clearly certain of the prohibited activities will only apply to public sector 
organisations that use or have access to public funds and resources64 or involves 
the acts or omissions of public officials65 and disclosure of such wrongdoings 
64 S.3 definition of '·public funds or public resources" provides these include the money and 
stores of government agencies, local authorities, state owned enterprises, crown entities, LA TE, airport , pori and energy companies, any energy supply operation , the New Zealand Local 
Govenunent Association and any company or organisation controlled by that Association and 65 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. s3 st<1tes "public official" me::ins <111 employee of <1 public 
sector organisation (this phrase is also defined in section 3 and includes amongst others the 
Office of the Clerk if the House of Representatives, the Parliamentary Service, an intelligence 
and securit)1 agency and LATE) or is someone that is concerned in the management of a public sector organisations. 
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will usually be in the public interest. It is accepted that actions of public officials 
that use and deal with public funds should be open to public scrutiny. Indeed the 
Code of Conduct of Public Servants66 requires that all public servants to show 
"reasonable care, and neither use, nor allow the use of departmental property, 
resources, or funds for anything other than authorised purposes"67 and at all 
times " public servants must therefore observe the principles of fairness and 
impartiality in all official dealings". 68 Employees of State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) and other commercially focused organisations such as Local Authority 
Trading Enterprises (LATE) are covered by this code of conduct. This fact was 
used by the Government Administration Committee to recommend the inclusion 
of both SOE and LATE as (public sector) organisations subject to Bill. The 
original draft of the Bill had not included such organisations within the public 
sector category and instead they were treated in a similar way to their private 
sector counterparts. 1t was argued that the statutory regime should not apply to 
them as they are under a legal obligation to operate as successful businesses. 
The Select Committee while not disagreeing with this submission preferred to 
include SOE and LATE within the definition of public sector organisation for 
reasons of consistency69 and that they are publicly owned . 
3. Serious risk to public health, public safety and maintenance ~flaw. 
This category of wrongdoing, the writer suggests, involves activities of both 
private and public sector organisations that would have a substantial and 
detrimental impact on the health and safety of New Zealanders, for the example 
the dumping of toxic chemicals. An interpretation of "serious risk" in this 
manner is preferable in terms of limiting the protection of the PDA to serious 
malfeasance. For the alternative interpretation of ' serious risk' as meaning a 
risk that has a substantial or high likelihood of occurring, could result in an 
66 State Sector Act 1988 s57 provides for the State Services Commission to prescribe tJ1e 
minimum standards of integrity and conduct that arc to apply to the public service and apply to 
public servants by virtue of the State Sector Act 1988 
67 State Services Commission, Code of Conduct, Second Principle . 
. www.ssc.govt. nzldocumcnts/codc of conduct/codc4.html (page I of 3) 68 State Services Commission, Code of Conduct, Second Principle, 
www.ssc.govt .n7/documcnts/codc of conduct/codc4 . html (page 2 of 3) 69 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, no 208- 2, vi (the select committee rcpo,1 ). 
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activity that has minor public health and safety consequences falling within the 
PDA scheme. 
The terms 'public health' or 'public safety' are not defined by the Act, although 
the writer suggests that the terms would cover activities that affect the health and 
safety of all people of New Zealand or a community or section of such people.70 
Particular communities or sections could be those in a specific geographic area, 
or even those patients at a particular hospital. For example in the Neil Pugmire 
case, the disclosure concerned the release of recidivist paedophiles into the 
community. The particular sector of the community would be the youth of 
W •71 anganut. 
This requirement that the risk be to public safety or public health arguably means 
that if the risk were to only one person, for instance a specific employee in a 
factory, then this would not be a risk within the context of the PDA. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that in other legislation where it is intended 
that an activity cover both public safety and the safety of an individual, this is 
specifically stated. For instance in Part II of the Dangerous Goods Act 1974 that 
requires that a licence be issued for dangerous goods in I ight "of the interests of 
public safety or the safety of any person ... " 72Finally similar arguments can also 
be made in interpreting the ambit of the phrase 'serious risk ' in relation to the 
maintenance of the law. 
4. C?ffences. 
The fourth type of serious wrongdoing concerning the commission of offences is 
likely to have the greatest impact on private sector organisations. The 
Legislature in amending the PDA to again include the private sector appears to 
have overlooked the fundamentally different interests of the private sector. The 
70 See Health and Disability Services Act 1993, s2 which provides a statutOI)' definition of 
'public health' as the health of all people of New Zealand or a community or section of such 
~eople. 
1 Neil Pugmire did not assert that the employer, Good Health Wanganui , had committed an 
offence or even was involved in mismanagement. His concern was that as result of the 
implementation of government policy that repeated sex offenders were being returned to tJ1e 
community. 
72 Dangerous Goods Act 1974, s 9(4)(b). 
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question that must be asked is whether it is in the public interest that minor 
offences of private sector businesses or of the senior management of those 
businesses should attract the protection of the PDA? For the Act does not restrict 
this category of wrongdoing to either serious offences or at least those offences 
that relate in some degree to the public interest and although the title of the 
section is " serious wrongdoings" , it is unlikely this, by itself, will allow the 
courts to restrict the interpretation of offences to only serious offences. 
For as stated one of the purposes of the PDA73 is to promote the public interest, 
by facilitating the disclosure of wrnngdoing . However for a disclosure to qualify 
as a protected disclosure under section 6, the Act does not require that the 
wrongdoing must be against the public interest. Accordingly it appears that the 
underlying policy of the PDA is that any wrongdoing is bad and therefore 
regardless of the triviality of an offence, it is in the public interest that an 
employee can disclose it and in certain situations do so outside of the 
organisation . 
Further when the Government Administration Committee considered whether the 
Bill should be amended to exclude trivial offences, the Committee rejected 
restricting the definition to "an act, omission or course of conduct that constitutes 
a serious offence". 74 This option it was considered would create a far higher 
threshold than considered appropriate and would place a burden of knowledge of 
what is a serious offence on the discloser. The report continues " (f]ixing an 
arbitrary cut off line also gives rise to difficulties where there is an important 
nexus between the type of offending and the functions and duties of the public 
official or organisation concerned". 75 This rationale may have some merit when 
the Bill was limited in application to the public sector, but as the PDA 
encompasses all private sector organisations, the absence of a proviso restricting 
disclosures to offences of a more serious nature or those that should be disclosed 
in the public interest substantially increases the scope of the Act. For instance 
73 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. s5 (a) . 
74 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, no 208-2. ix (the select committer reports) referred to this 
definition and also to the definition of serious offence in The Crimes Acts 257 A as an offence 
runishable by imprisonment for a terms of 5 years of more. 5 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996. no 208- 2. ix (the select committee reports) 
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minor offences relating to regulatory requirements of for example the Companies 
Act 1993, that essentially are of no interest to any one other than the company 
involved, 76 can legitimately be the subject of protected disclosures under the Act. 
The writer believes that given the stated purpose of the Act and the deliberate 
statements of the Select Committee, any submission that there should be implied 
into the definition of 'offence' a requirement that the information should be 
disclosed in the public interest is unlikely to be successful. Therefore although 
disclosures of minor and essentially trivial offences could potentially be 
harassment of an employer, as long as the employee does not make a false 
allegation or otherwise acts in bad faith, the disclosure will be protected under 
the PDA. Other than employers ensuring that workplaces have effective 
procedures for whistleblowers, which may reduce the number of disclosures 
outside the organisation by current employees, with regard to former employees, 
the only potential remedy against an employee who blows the whistle on some 
trivial offence will be if the courts in considering if a discloser is ' otherwise in 
bad faith ' under section 20, takes into account the seriousness of the matter 
disclosed and also the public interest content of that subject matter. The 
application of section 20 is discussed later in this paper. 
As stated section 6 establishes the elements that must be present before a 
disclosure is protected by the Act and provides that the serious wrongdoing must 
'in or by that organisation '. This phrase indicates that it will not be necessary for 
the courts to apply the legal principles developed to attribute the actions of 
certain senior officers and directors of an organisation, as the actions of the 
organisation itself However if as a result of a disclosure, an organisation was 
the subject of a civil action or criminal charges, the rules of attribution stated in 
76 The Registrar of Companies is not stated to be an Appropriate Authority in the Act, although 
t11e definition is not exhaustive. However the Registrar of Companies has the power to 
investigate if any company is failed to comply with tJ1e Companies Act 1993 or the Financial 
Reporting Act 1993 under Companies Act 1993, s 365. 
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Meridian Glohal Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 77 may 
need to be applied. 
A wrongdoing 'in an organisation' could be activity of a certain officer alone and 
this may be sufficient to satisfy section 6, without having to prove it is a 
wrongdoing by that organisation. Although it is not specifically required, the 
writer suggests that if a wrongdoing 'in an organisation', is in fact the activities 
of one individual, then for the Act to apply, the wrongdoing must relate in some 
way to that individual's activities on behalf of the organisation. 
5. Inclusive Definition 
Finally the list of serious wrongdoing is stated to "include" the above activities. 
Therefore it is the intention of the Legislature that activities beyond this list 
could be the subject of protected disclosures, although it is difficult to imagine 
such a case. However the fact that there is potential for protected disclosure of 
other activities leaves all organisations in a state of some uncertainty. 
C. Qualifying Disclosures. 
1. Definition 
Before an employee can disclose any public interest information under the PDA, 
whether internally or externally, that employee must satisfy the requirements of 
section 6 of the Act : 
6 Disclosures to which Act applies 
(J) An employee of ;in org;inis;ition nrny disclose infornrntion in the 
mmmcr provided by this Act if-
77 Jvferidinn Global Funds A!nnngemenl Asia Ltd v 5,'ecurilies Commission [ 1995] 3 WLR 413 . In 
this judgmcnt the Privy Council set out the rnlcs of attribution that should be ;ipplied when 
determining if the ;ictions of individuals within a company arc the acts of the company instead of 
applying the earlier principles based in identifying if the activities are of those people who can be 
classified as the directing mind <1nd will of the company developed in Tesco S11per111nrkets v 
Nnttrnss [1971 J 2 All ER 127. 
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(a) the information is about serious wrongdoing in or by that 
organisation ; and 
(b) the employee believes on reasonable grounds that the 
information is trne or likely to be true; and 
(c) the employee wishes to disclose the informatjon so that 
serious wrongdoing can be investigated; and 
(d) the employee wishes the disclosure to be protected. 
(2) Any disclosure made in accordance with subsection (1) is a 
protected disclosure of information for the purpose of this Act. 
As indicated above, one of the major difficulties of the Act arises because there 
is no express requirement that the employee believes that the information should 
be disclosed as it is in the public interest, before that disclosure is protected. The 
absence of this requirement potentially leaves organisations vulnerable to a wide 
range of disclosures and is in conflict with the current common law position. 
2. Common Law position 
It is well accepted at common law, that if an employee blows the whistle in the 
public interest, then the employee may be protected from a charge of breach of 
confidence on the basis of just cause or excuse. One rationale is the "disclosure 
was under a compulsion of law, that there was express or implied consent of the 
person to whom the duty [ of confidence] is owed to make disclosure or where 
disclosure is in the public interest'; .78 However analysis of case law indicates 
that while judges have upheld this principle, where the line is drawn between 
balancing the duty of confidence and the public interest has been the subject of 
some dispute. In Initial Services Limited v P11/leril/79, Lord Denning stated the 
doctrine extends to ' crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed 
as well as those in contemplation, provided always- and this is essential - that 
the disclosure is justified in the public interest. .. " 80 This can be compared to 
Lion Lahoratories Limited v Evans81 when the narrow formulation of the defence 
78 J Bowers, J Mitchell , and J Lewis /Vhistleblowing the New Law (Sweet & Maxwell , London, 
1999) 59. 
79 Initial Services Ltd v Putteri/111968] I QB 396 (CA) 
80 Initial Services Ltd v Pulleri/1119681 I QB 396 (CA), -W6-406 81 Lion Laboratories Limited v Evans f 1985] l QB 526 (CA) 
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as one that is limited to the existence of iniquity was rejected. O'Connor LJ 
stated "everything depends on the facts of the case; this the court will not restrain 
the exposure of fraud, criminal conduct, iniquity; but these are only examples of 
situations .. . " 82 
Accordingly the extent of the defence is unclear. But proving that disclosure was 
in the public interest is the starting point to obtaining relief from any retaliatory 
action by the employer. In New Zealand after the whistleblowing incident that 
prompted the PDA, Mr Pugmire brought a personal grievance claim under 
section 27 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 in response to the disciplinary 
action against him by Good Health Wanganui for disclosing information about 
the release of a dangerous patient. While the matter was resolved by an out of 
court confidential settlement in favour of Mr Pugmire, Castle J in Pugmire v 
Good Health Wanganui, 83 indicated an implicit support for the principle that a 
personal grievance claim could be upheld against an employer who retaliated 
against a bona tide whistleblower acting in the public interest on these factors. 84 
Therefore it is difficult to reconcile the common law and statutory positions with 
regard to the requirement that the information be in the public interest as the 
PDA distinguishes cases of whistleblowing not on the merits of the information 
being disclosed, but who is the choice of recipient for the information. It also 
creates the situation that if an employee discloses confidential information about 
an employer to the media, this would not be protected by the Act, but that 
employee may still be able to obtain relief at common law, if it was in the public 
interest that the information be disclosed . The Act is not stated to be a code and 
arguably the common law rules wil_l still apply when the disclosure is outside of 
the scheme of the Act. The extent that the existing case law will be useful as 
precedent to determine if a disclosure is protected by the Act is however 
doubtful. 
82 lion Laboratories Li111ited v Evans [ 19851 I QB 526, (CA) 
83 Pugmire v Good I !ealth fllanganui Ltd (No ]) ! 1994 I I ERNZ IN . 84 See also Lion Lahoratories limited v Evans [ l 985] I QB 526 where 2 ex-employees wanted to 
disclose information about a for111er employer as to inaccuracies in equipment made by that 
e111ployer. The Court of Appeal held that it was not necessary in such circumstances to find 
wrongdoing, it was sufficient that the i11for111ation should be disclosed in the public interest. 
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3. True or likely to be true. 
An essential requirement of a qualifying disclosure is that the employee must 
believe on reasonable grounds that the information about some serious 
wrongdoing ' is true or likely to be true'. The Act does not require that the 
employee have any evidence or proof of wrongdoing, although one would 
imagine there normally would need to be some evidence to support a claim of 
wrongdoing, especially when it is disclosed externally . The employee is not 
subject to any penalty if the subject matter of the disclosure is not proven, 
although if an allegation is proven to be made by a person knowing that it is false 
or otherwise in bad faith, then the protection of the Act wi II not apply . 85 
However there is vast grey area between disclosures that are made in bad faith 
and disclosures by responsible corporate citizens who make a fully informed 
decision to disclose protected information in the public interest. The problem 
when whistleblowing occurs outside of the organisation is that for disclosed 
information to be shown is untrue, it will in many cases first need to be 
investigated. The fact that a whistleblower may not be fully informed of all 
relevant facts may not be obvious to an appropriate authority or the Ombudsmen 
or relevant Minister. The risk that external bodies may investigate and 
inadvertently disclose confidential and essentially private matters is legitimately 
a concern to the private sector, but as discussed, it is a business risk that can be 
reduced by adopting effective internal procedures that keep the information 
within the organisation. 
However one of the grounds on which a disgruntled employee can disclose 
externally at the second level is when there has been no action or recommended 
action on the matter following disclosure by that employee at the first level 
within 20 working days.86 There is no guidance in the PDA as to what would be 
sufficient ' action' to counter this right and the writer questions how would the 
external authority know if any action had been taken or not until they 
investigated the matter. The head of an organisation may have taken no action, 
because after investigating a matter, the allegation of wrongdoing was not 
85 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 20. 
86 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s9(c) . 
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proven. Would an employee who was dissatisfied by the decision to take no 
action in such circumstance still be entitled to disclose the matter externally? 
4. Intention of the Discloser 
The third and fourth requirements for a qualifying discloser refer to the wishes of 
an employee; namely that the employee wishes to disclose the information so 
that the serious wrongdoing can be investigated and secondly that the employee 
wishes the disclosure to be protected . The second of these requirements is likely 
to be the subject of little comment. The first requirement that the employee 
wishes that a wrongdoing be investigated appears at first glance to be more 
notable as seems to provide some guidance as the requisite purpose of that 
employee. However a desire to have a wrongdoing investigated could be 
motivated by a range of factors from a belief that it is in the public interest to do 
so, to a desire, prompted by malice, that having the organisation or individual in 
an organisation investigated, will bring the subject of the investigation into 
disrepute. In either situation providing that the end result was to cause the 
employee to wish to have a serious wrongdoing investigated, the resulting 
disclosure of information about that wrongdoing, as long the employee believed 
it to be true or likely to be true, would attract the protection of the Act. 
In conclusion the writer believes the absence in section 6 of any effective safe 
guard to screen disclosures of minor offences and those motivated by other than 
good faith objectives is of critical importance to the success of the Act. 
D. Natu rat Justice and tl,e Obligation of Conffrlentiality 
Public sector organisations are required under the PDA to establish internal 
procedures for receiving and dealing with information about serious wrongdoing. 
These procedures must refer to the effects of section 8 (disclosures to the head of 
an organisation) section 9 (disclosures to appropriate authorities) and section 10 
(disclosure to a Minister or the Ombudsman) . The internal procedures are 
required to identify the persons in the organisation to whom disclosures may be 
made and comply with the ' principles of natural justice ' . The Privacy 
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Commissioner m his submission to the Select Committee m 199787 recorded 
some concern regarding the natural justice requirement, in that the initial 
inquiries of an organisation following a wrongdoing may be investigative, rather 
than administrative in nature. The right to a fair unbiased hearing and that a 
person must be given full information about an accusation are the basic tenets of 
procedural requirements of natural justice. It is the second of these inherent 
rights that may counter the ability of an organisation to effectively investigate an 
alleged wrongdoing. An investigative inquiry may need to initially proceed with 
a degree of secrecy not to just protect the whistleblower, but also in order to 
prevent a suspected wrongdoer disposing of evidence of that wrongdoing. It is 
difficult to imagine how in such a circumstance a public sector organisation, that 
is required to comply with the principles of natural justice, could conduct an 
investigation without leaving itself open to later accusations of procedural 
impropriety. This argument does not deny the place of natural justice procedures 
being implemented in any later hearing. For if the preliminary investigation 
reveals prima facie evidence of wrongdoing, then "if the relevant circumstances 
are ones in which natural justice would normally be involved (for example, if a 
matter gives rise to a formal disciplinary process) the natural justice obligations 
would need to be reflected in internal guidelines in any case". 88 
As discussed the concept of natural justice, while difficult to precisely define, 
includes concepts such as the obligations to act fairly, the right to be given 
advance knowledge of the opposing case, including in some circumstances a 
right to know who is your accuser. Joseph in Constitutional and Administrative 
Law in New Zealand stated "[t]here is a prima facie breach of natural justice if all 
relevant evidential material is not disclosed". 89 Joseph identifies exceptions to 
this general rule are when the disclosure is in breach of confidence or is injurious 
to public interest. The PDA in section 19 places a statutory responsibility on the 
person who receives a protected disclosure, to use their best endeavours to keep 
87 Office of the Privc1cy Commissioner " Report by the Privacy Commissioner to the Minister of 
Justice on the Protected Disclosures Bill" 13 Mc1y 1997 (www.privc1cy.org.nzJpeople/pdisc.htmJ 88 Office of the Privc1cy Commissioner, c1bove n 87, parn 4.5.4 
89 P Joseph Constitutional and A d111inistmtive Lalll in Ne w Zealand (fhe Lmv Book Co, Sydney, 
1993) 726. 
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the identity of the discloser confidential, other than in exceptional cases. These 
exceptions include if the whistleblower consents to being identified or it is 
reasonably believed by the person receiving the disclosure as essential having 
regard to the principles of natural justice. It may be difficult for organisations to 
reconcile the references in sections 15 and 19 to the principles of natural justice 
against the requirements to maintain the secrecy of the discloser's identity. 
Therefore the requirements of natural justice will likely impact on the 
implementation of a successful whistleblowing scheme in two ways. Firstly it 
may inhibit a successful investigation of an alleged wrongdoing and secondly the 
requirements that the identity of the discloser be protected are eroded by a strict 
application of the procedural requirements of natural justice. 
New Zealand courts have been very reluctant to allow the suppression of the 
identity of witnesses in criminal cases, for example when intimidation has been 
alleged, on the basis that the right to know the identity of an accuser is a 
fundamental principle of natural · Jaw.90 While rigidity to the concept of 
procedural fairness may be justifiable in criminal prosecutions, the courts have 
observed that procedural as well as substantive fairness must also be observed in 
employment law situations. 9 1 In personal grievance actions resulting from the 
dismissal of employees, in par1, due to complaints from colleagues whose 
identities were kept confidential , the cou11s have observed that the persons 
dismissed had a right to full information of all matters surrounding the dismissal. 
The fact that dismissed employees did not know the identity of the complainants, 
meant that the employees could not review the reliability of the complaints and 
thus raised the issue of procedural unfairness .92 
Further under the common law, when a whistleblower has revealed information 
about an employer and later it is proved that the requisite ' public interest ' 
90 See R v Hines [ 19971 3 NZLR 529 (CA) in which the Court of Appeal by a majority of 3-2 
refused to review ils previous findin g in R v Hughes I l 986] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) that an w1dercover 
~oliceman was required to disclose his true name, address and occupation. 1 Nelson A ir Ltd v NZ4 LPZ 1199-t I ERNZ 665 (CA) 
92 See 5.'pot/ess .'i'ervices (NZ) Ltd v Parker 17/2/98 Palmer J CEC 7/98 and Dallas v Wellington 
Ne wspapers lie/ 2/-t /98 Goddard CJ WEC 2-t/8. 
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standard is not met, the employer if it does not know the identity of the 
whistleblower, can succeed in discovering the whistleblower' s identity from the 
recipient of the information. 93 The PDA is silent as to whether an organisation 
can discover the identity of a discloser, if it is shown that discloser made a false 
allegation or acted otherwise in bad faith. Section 20 provides that protections 
conferred by the Act will not apply in such circumstances and arguable the right 
to keep ones identity secret is a protection provided by the Act. In many cases 
the issue will be irrelevant as the organisation will have discovered the identity 
of the discloser, in order to show that the particular employee knew the 
information was false or was motivated by malice or ill will. If the organisation 
had yet to discover the identity of the whistleblower, the common law rules may 
apply to assist an organisation in such circumstances. 
Finally the principles of the Privacy Act may also be in conflict with these 
natural justice considerations which require the disclosure of personal 
information about the alleged wrongdoer and also about any third party involved 
in the alleged actions. 
E. Second Level Disclosures 
J. Appropriate Authorities 
As stated employees of organisations under the PDA have the right pursuant to 
section 9 to disclose information about their employer outside of the organisation 
to appropriate authorities if certain requirements are satisfied. As a result 
authorities such as the Commissioner of Police, the Controller and Auditor-
General, the Ombudsmen, or the head of the Serious Fraud Office among others, 
as appropriate authorities, may be told confidential sensitive information about 
an organisation without those organisations having any opportunity to review or 
comment on what is being disclosed or even the opportunity to defend itself prior 
to the disclosure. However of more concern to the effectiveness of the PDA as a 
93 P Bartlett and others (eel) Employment Contracts (Brooker ' s. Wellington 1991) Conunon Law, 
para 16. 1.07(8), (updated 2 FebruaI)' 1998). 
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weapon to facilitate the investigation of serious wrongdoing, is the failure of the 
Act to provide bodies, that do not have any existing authority to operate in the 
private sector, with statutory authority to investigate wrongdoings when the 
alleged wrongdoing is within a private sector organisation . This point is 
discussed further under constitutional issues. 
2. Constitutional issue 
The Select Committee Report identified this issue as one that had been raised by 
the Ombudsman that the original Bill required public sector officials to exercise 
jurisdiction in the private sector. The Report stated that the Ombudsman for this 
reason had made a submission that ·it would be preferable to channel complaints 
arising from the private sector to specific officials in the public sector. The 
Select Committee Report did not see the need to consider this issue as the Bill (in 
1997) had been amended to exclude the private sector. "We note that it is not the 
policy of the bill to extend jurisdiction of public sector officials into the private 
sector" .94 The committee then concluded " if coverage is extended to the private 
sector (in the future) .. . . the issue may need to be considered further at that 
point" .95 
Unfortunately although the PDA has now been extended to the private sector, 
this issue was ignored . For while the Act contains a provision empowering the 
Ombudsman to have the same powers in relation to investigating a disclosure of 
information under that Act as in relation to a complaint under the Ombudsman 
Act 197596, there is no statutory power given to any other public sector official 
who may receive a disclosure of information about a private sector organisation 
to investigate that disclosure. Curiously under section 23 , authority is given to 
the Ombudsmen to investigate the disclosure of information, but no power to 
investigate the wrongdoing. One may lead to the other, as the Ombudsman to 
investigate a disclosure will usually have to investigate whether there was a 
wrongdoing that precipitated the information, in order for the disclosure to be 
94 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, 110 208-2, viii (the select committee reports) 
95 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, 110 208- 2, viii (the select committee reports) 
96 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 23 
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protected. But as one of the stated aims of the Act is to investigate wrongdoing, 
this should be the primary power, rather than a power to investigate the 
disclosure itself Accordingly even the Ombudsman has no express power to 
investigate a wrongdoing, other than incidentally to an investigation of the 
disclosure of information. 
The only express authority given to "appropriate authorities" as the recipients of 
second level disclosures in the PDA is the power to refer disclosures that can be 
more suitably and conveniently investigated by another authority, to that 
h · 97 aut onty . For example, if the State Services Commissioner receives a 
disclosure of information about a wrongdoing by a private sector organisation, 
then if it was about a criminal matter, pursuant to section 16, the matter could be 
referred to the Commissioner of Police who would then have authority to 
investigate the matter under the Crimes Act 1961 or other such statute. Similarly 
if the matter was about the environment or serious fraud then the matter could be 
referred to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment or the Serious 
Fraud Office. However as the Commission of State Services is solely a creation 
of statute law, for the Commission itself to be able to investigate a serious 
wrongdoing in the private sector, this function and corresponding power to so 
operate, must also be derived from statute. The Commission was established by 
the State Sector Act 1988, which provides that the "Commission has all such 
powers as are reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its 
functions and duties under this Act or any other enactment". The State Sector 
Act 1988 does not give the Commission power to investigate any activity in the 
private sector and the PDA, as the only other enactment that could be a source of 
such power, is also silent . ln section 9 of the PDA it is stated that appropriate 
authorities, like the State Services Commissioner, may receive second level 
disclosures, however the Act does hot specify in this section or elsewhere what 
such a body is required to do with the information once it has been received . 
Thus the failure of the PDA to empower or even require appropriate authorities 
to investigate an alleged wrongdoing, let alone require a private sector 
97 Protected Disclosures Act 2000. s 16. 
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organisation to disclose information to it, is fundamental and one that need to be 
urgently addressed if the Act is to achieve its stated objectives. 
3. Link;ng of information to appropriate authorities 
One method that could be used to avoid this constitutional problem would be to 
link the sort of information being disclosed to an appropriate external authority. 
as this would ensure information concerning wrongdoings is directly disclosed to 
those authorities that have the jurisdiction and authority to investigate the 
particular matter. This was suggested by the Privacy Commissioner in 199798 in 
his submission to the Select Committee. This submission was rejected as it was 
argued that this would create a confusing scheme for whistleblowers. The 
alternative that we face is that an authority that receives a protected disclosure of 
information and believes that the information can be more suitably investigated 
by another authority may refer that information on to that other authority.99 This 
clearly increases the risk of an inadvertent ' leak ' of information. 
The United Kingdom passed the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) in 1998, 
which commenced July 2 1999 and introduced new provisions into the 
Employment Rights Act 1996. The PTDA defines a qualifying disclosure as one 
which in the reasonable belief of the worker tends to show a criminal offence, a 
failure to comply with any legal obligation, a miscarriage of justice, the 
endangerment of health and the safety of any individual, damage to the 
environment or the concealment of any information showing any of the above 
actions. Under the PIDA there are six ways in which a worker can make a 
qualifying disclosure. Importantly if the information is to be disclosed outside of 
the organisation, there is requirement that it be disclosed, except in exceptionally 
serious cases, to a ' prescribed person '. A prescribed person is a person or body 
who the Secretary of State prescribes for the purpose of receiving disclosures 
about certain matters .100 The writer suggests the failure of the PDA to link the 
98 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, above n 87 . 
99 Protected Disclosur~s Act 2000, s 16. 
100 See The Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) Order 1999 (UK) 
subject matter of external disclosures to 'appropriate authorities' also increases 
privacy and confidentiality concerns of the Act 
4. Disclosure to the Media 
As well as linking the subject matter of disclosures to specified authorities, the 
PIDA differs from the PDA in that it provides in certain circumstances a 
protected disclosure may be made to the media. The PDA does not include the 
media in the list of 'appropriate authorities' and as "they are clearly dissimilar 
enough from those listed that it would be exceptionally hard to argue, on basic 
principles of statutory interpretation, that they should be deemed appropriate". 101 
Proceeding on the basis that disclosure to the media is excluded from the 
protection of the PDA and this assumption is supported by the Select Committee 
report that stated that the Committee "consider [ ed) that journalists should not be 
included within the definition of appropriate authority" as the "bill sets out a 
system that will discourage whistleblowers from making public their concerns 
about the serious wrongdoings in their work place". 102 This attitude can be 
compared with the PIDA 103 when what is described as 'second level external 
disclosures" can be made to external bodies including the media. In 
'Whistleblowing: the New Law' the authors state: 104 
Under section 43G ... disclosures must meet three quite stringent tests 111 
order to be protected. The first of these (section 43G(l)(a)-(c) deals in 
general terms with the good faith or other motives of the whistlcblowcr. The 
second (section 43G(2)) sets out three preconditions, one of which must be 
met if the disclosure is to be capable of protection. Finally. to be protected 
the disclosure must be reasonable in all the circumstances (section 43G(l)(e) 
and (3)). 
Importantly the PTDA specifies what factors the court must have regard to when 
considering all the circumstances and includes the identity of the person to whom 
101 Katrinc Evans "Protecting lnsidcrs"(2000) 542 Law Talk, 19. 
102 Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, 208-2, viii (the select committee reports) 
103 Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 (UK), note this Act in fact amended the Employment 
Rights Act 199 6(UK) by insc1iing a new Part IVA, being new sections ss -DA to 43H of the 
1996 Act 
104 J Bowers, J Mitchell and J Lewis, above n 78, 3-l. 
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the disclosure is made, the seriousness of the relevant failure , whether the failure 
is likely to happen again in the future, if the matter had already been disclosed to 
an employer, what the employer had done and finally in certain circumstances 
whether the worker had followed the correct procedure laid down by the 
employer. 
In light of these considerations it is unlikely that the media would at first instance 
be an appropriate body to whom a qualifying disclosure is made. 105 While the 
PIDA has been criticised as establishing a system for disclosure that is complex 
and potentially confusing for any one wishing to blow the whistle on 
organisational wrongdoing, it does direct the court to clearly examine the motives 
of the whistleblower and in certain prescribed circumstances to allow disclosure 
to the media. This the writer submits is a preferable position to excluding the 
media entirely from the PDA as it "overlook[s] the important role of newspapers 
in a free society" '06and would ,;reduce the personal risk for disclosers in 
situations which may provide the greatest ease of reporting for those who wish to 
get something effective done about their concerns". 107 
However with the PDA in its present form, it is probably a valuable protection for 
organisations that disclosures to the media are not encouraged by qualifying as 
protected disclosures under the Act. There have also been numerous cases where 
information has been leaked to Members of Parliament, usually in an opposition 
party, who use that information to ask questions in Parliament in the purported 
interests of the public. This type of disclosure is also not covered by the PDA as 
Members of Parliament are specificall y excluded from the list of appropriate 
authorities . 
105 Mayne, above n -l5 , 327 . 
106 "Whistleblower law a concern" The Press, Christchurch, New Zealand, 22 March 2000, 42. 
107 Evans, above 11101 , 19. 
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F False Allegations 
1. Definition 
A further issue will be the ambit of section 20, which establishes when the 
protections provided by the Act are to be withdrawn . It provides that when a 
person 'makes an allegation known to that person to be false or otherwise acts in 
bad faith' then the statutory protections against victimisation will not apply . 
2. Allegations that are known to he false. 
As previously discussed one of the criteria of section 6 for a disclosure to qualify 
for protection is that the employee must have reasonable grounds to believe that 
the information is 'true or likely to be true' . This probably objective requirement 
will need to be kept in mind when the courts decide on whom the burden of proof 
falls when applying section 20. Logically it would need to be the same party for 
both sections. However it is likely that it will be up to the organisation that 
wishes to bring an action against a discloser to produce evidence that the 
employee knew the information was not true or not likely to be true. The writer 
acknowledges there is a distinction in law as to the standard of proof required to 
show that someone did not in fact believe information to be ' true or likely to be 
true ' compared to proving that someone knew information to be false . However 
for an employer to prove that an employee had no reasonable grounds to believe 
information to be true, may often result in the employer proving that the 
employee knew that it was false. Therefore the two tests may in fact be very 
similar. 
3. Allegations that are otherwise in had.faith 
However the second exception of when an employee acts ' otherwise in bad faith ' 
causes more difficulties as it raises the question that if an employee who believes 
information to be true, but discloses it for reasons of malice or revenge, will the 
protection of the Act be lost? Further as discussed there are problems with the 
interpretation of section 6 as there is no express requirement that the discloser 
must believe the information should be available in the public interest and it may 
be difficult to convince the cou11s that such a public interest requirement should 
be implied . Tf the courts take a broad approach to what is a disclosure ' otherwise 
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m bad faith' as including situations when a discloser is motivated by reasons 
other than the public interest, then this potentially is be a backdoor method of 
restricting the application of the Act. Therefore one of the critical issues of the 
Act will be the width afforded to this phrase by the courts. 
Applying the principles of statutory interpretation, there are several possible 
approaches that the courts may take. Firstly in the Act itself there is some 
guidance. Section 20 is headed "false allegations" and pursuant to section 5 of 
the Interpretation Act 1999, the meaning of an enactment may be considering in 
light of the headings to a section. Accordingly an action that is "otherwise in bad 
faith" may arguably be limited to situations analogous to disclosing information 
knowing that it is false, such as being reckless to the truth of a matter or 
disregarding the truth. This may even extend to a situation when someone 
intentionally discloses only part of certain information or discloses it in such a 
manner as to create a misleading understanding of the actions of an organisation. 
The information that is disclosed may be true and therefore would not literally be 
a false allegation, but it does create a false impression that can be as damaging 
and is likely to be classed as otherwise in bad faith 
This argument is supported by the Government Administration Committee 
Report that indicates that the Committee was not anticipating protection being 
withdrawn on grounds other than for people who make false complaints. "We 
note that while the bill does not include penal provisions against employees who 
make false complaints, it does not provide protection for such employees. False 
allegations are specifically excluded from protection by clause 17 of the bill" . 108 
Clause 17 of the Bill has been restated without amendment in section 20 of the 
Act. 
However the Minister of State Services, the Hon Trevor Mallard, stated during 
the Third Reading of the Bill if "people act in bad faith, if they are making up 
108Protected Disclosures Bill 1996, no 208-2, x (the select committee reports) 
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something, if they are being malicious, then this legislation will not protect 
them .... they will be gone". 109 This statement supports an interpretation of the 
bad faith as extending to when a person discloses information, that is known to 
be true, but for reasons of spite or ill will. There is a strong argument that as a 
matter of statutory interpretation that "otherwise in bad faith" should extend to 
cover this sort of situation because by its inclusion in the Act, the Legislature has 
indicated that protection can be withdrawn in situations other than false 
allegations. Otherwise the phrase has no meaning. Such an interpretation may 
address concerns that an employee who is solely motivated by grounds of malice 
can be protected as long as it can be proven on reasonable grounds that the 
information disclosed is likely to be true. However would evidence of the 
existence of ill will alone be sufficient to lose the protection of the Act? What if 
it was proven that a discloser was partly motivated by reasons of malice and 
partly for public interest factors? 
The writer suggests that one approach that the courts may use to answer these 
questions is to use by analogy the principles that the courts have developed in 
interpreting section I 9 of the Defamation Act I 992. For both provisions operate 
to withdraw the statutory protection against the legal effects of disclosure of 
information in certain circumstances. Section I 9 of the Defamation Act 1992 
sets out the circumstances when the defence of qualified privilege against a claim 
for defamation is rebutted. The foundation of the defence of qualified privilege 
is "an acceptance that there are situations in which one may have a duty to tell 
the truth as one sees it without being liable to a damages claim if one is 
mistaken". 110 It is essential to the privilege that the maker of the statement has a 
duty to make it, but also that the· recipient of the information has a duty or 
interest in receiving it. The parallels with the making of a protected disclosure 
are evident. The Defamation Act 1992 section I 9 provides as follows: 
109 (29 Mar 2000) NZPD http:/rangi/knowlcdgc-baskct.co.n:z/hansard/ 
11 0 New Zealand Law Commission J)efa111ing Politicians A re.\ponse lo Lange v A tkinson: R6./ 
(Wellington, 2000) l . 
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19 Rebullal of Qualified Privilege 
(I) In any proceedings for defamation, a defence of qualified privilege shall 
fail if the plaintifT proves that , in publishing the mailer that is tl1e subject of 
the proceedings, the defendant was predominantly motivated by ill will 
toward the plaintifT, or otherwise took improper advantage of tl1e occasion of 
the publication. 
(2) Subject to subsection (I) of this section, a defence of qualified privilege 
shall not fail because the defendant was motivated by malice. 
Accordingly a determination by the courts of the degree that ill will was the 
motivating factor is essential to the loss of a qualified privilege defence. 
Although in the Defamation Act 1992 the term ' malice' has been abandoned in 
favour or the above statutory test, previous case law is still relevant as it is highly 
unlikely that behaviour that is malicious will not fall within the section 19.111 In 
terms of section 19, existence of ill will alone will not defeat a claim of 
privilege.112 This only will occur when "the defendant ' s animosity is his or her 
sole reason for publishing that way" . 113 The burden of proving ill will is on the 
plaintiff although it recognised that it can be a difficult to establish a defendant's 
motives for publication . Clearly if it can be shown that the defendant did not 
believe what was published that this is clear evidence of ill will. Generally the 
privilege is only to be withdrawn when the reason that the report was published 
or the statement made goes beyond the original reason for the privilege, namely 
that it was in the public interest that certain information be published . While 
there has been much legal debate and discussion about the nature of the public 
interest when the privilege is claimed by newspapers and publishers of general 
circulation, the extent of qualified privilege in regard to commentary on our 
political worthies is well beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed the nature of 
statements in those circumstances clearly falls outside of disclosures protected by 
the PDA. However the more traditional view of qualified privilege applies also 
to such things as references given by an employer, or an entry in ship ' s logbook 
111 J Burrows and U Cheer Medin Lall' in New Zen/and (-lth ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1999) 83. 
11 2 J Burrows and U Cheer, above n I 11 , 83 . 
11 3 J Burrows and U Cheer, above n 111 , 83. 
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and requires the courts to find a "common and corresponding duty or interest 
between the person who makes the communication and the person who receives 
it" .114 However to rebut the defence in a defamation proceedings express or 
actual malice, which at common law meant ill will or spite towards the plaintiff, 
or any indirect or improper motive must be proven by the plaintiff. At common 
law it had to be shown that such malice existed at the time of publication and that 
this was the defendant's sole or dominant motive for publishing the words in 
question. In terms of proving the existence of ill will, use of excessive language 
within a privilege occasion may be evidence of ill will. Further in the absence of 
any intrinsic evidence of good will, judges have allowed evidence to be 
presented to juries of extrinsic evidence of ill will , such as what the defendant 
did or said, before, at the time of or after the publication, including if the 
defendant has made other defamatory statements or if there is evidence of 
· d" 11 5 previous 1sputes. Therefore if the phrase ' otherwise in bad faith' 1s 
interpreted by analogy with rules governing the loss of privilege, then the 
existence of malice and ill will, if this is the motivating reason behind the 
disclosure, may cause the discloser to lose the protection of the PDA. 
One criticism of a wide interpretation of 'otherwise in bad faith ' is that it will 
discourage an employee from disclosing a wrongdoing. If someone has in the 
past had a disagreement with an employer, can this be used as evidence of bad 
faith? In Whist/eh/owing- Subversion or Corporate Citizenship ?, the editor 
refers to the catch 22 predicament of whistleblowers. 11 6 
" Tf they do not exlrnust internal channels. their deed seems irresponsible; 
they do harm without being able to show that it was necessary. Yet if they 
do exhaust all internal clrnnncls, they must have acquired grouses against 
their employers - if they do not have them already - since their employers 
have failed to heed their appe,ils. 
11 4 The Lall's o.f Ne w Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington. 199-l) vol I 0. Defanrntion. para 98. 
11 5 Lmvs of New Zeal,ind, above n 11-l, p,ira 12-l 
11 6 Vinten, ,ibove n3 . 13. 
If the courts interpret 'otherwise in bad faith ' as including when the 
whistleblowers action is motivated by other than public duty, this is likely to 
discourage employees blowing the whistle, especially outside of the 
organisation. The purpose of the PDA is to encourage the activity in prescribed 
situations. This can be achieved by clear guidelines as to when a disclosure is 
protected and when it will not be, so a prospective whistleblower can predict the 
likely effect of their actions, at least in terms of the employment relationship . If 
uncertainty exists, and a potential whistleblower has to consider the past 
relationship with the employer and other circumstances that may be interpreted 
as bad faith to an employer, then the meaning given to this section will seriously 
impact on the success of the statutory protection scheme. 
The writer suggests the PDA would more successfully achieve a balance 
between the rights of employers and encouraging employees to disclose serious 
wrongdoing if the Act contained tighter limits of the types of activities that 
qualify as protected disclosures and secondly if the circumstances when the 
protection of the Act are withdrawn were drafted using more definite and precise 
language. Restricting section 20 to when a person knows information to be false 
or misleading or when a person is reckless to the truth of information would 
avoid much of this uncertainty. In Australia some of the states have enacted 
whistleblowing legislation. The Australian Capital Territories enacted the 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 that applies to offences and misconduct of 
public officials. In the equivalent provision to section 20, a person is prohibited 
from knowingly or reckless making a false or misleading statement with the 
intention that it be acted on a public interest disclosure. Infringement of the 
section is a criminal offence. Similarly in Queensland, the Whistleblowers 
Protections Act 1994 provides that it is an offence to intentionally give 
information that is false or misleading in a material particular.117 The writer 
suggests that either of these approaches is preferable to the wording of the 
current section 20 . 
11 7 Whistleblowers Protection Act 199-l, s 56 (Queensland) 
44 
If the courts take a broad approach to actions that are otherwise in bad faith , 
employees who lose the protection of the Act, may still have a remedy under the 
common law. Analysis of the common law cases provides that protection has 
been available in certain situations where public interest factors so demand, but 
questions of the motive of the whistleblower have not been the focus of the 
court ' s inquiry in such cases . As stated the Protected Disclosure Act is not stated 
to be a code and section 21 of the Act provides that any protections, privileges, 
immunity or defence, statutory or otherwise, relating to the disclosure of 
information are not limited by the Act. Therefore a person who loses protection 
under section 20, may still gain relief from any retaliatory action of the employer 
if the disclosure falls within the public interest categories recognised and 
protected by the common law. 
G Other l~sues 
1 Immunity 
As discussed employees who make protected disclosure of information are given 
immunity from any civil or criminal proceeding or from any disciplinary 
proceeding by reason of that disclosure. One issue is when the employees have 
themselves been involved in the wrongdoing . A lower level employee might 
rightly be able to claim, that he or she had no choice, but should a senior 
manager who may have even instigated the wrongdoing be afforded the same 
protection? Is the benefit to the public interest so great that having a wrongdoing 
disclosed in itself is sufficient to grant immunity to the whistleblower, regardless 
of all other factors? Clearly the Legislature believes this is so and declined to 
restrict immunity for those involved in the wrongdoing. This section of the PDA 
can be compared to the New South Wales Protected Disclosures Act I 994, which 
only applies to public sector employees. It provides that if a disclosure is made 
solely or substantially with the motive of avoiding dismissal or other disciplinary 
action, it is not a protected disclosure under that Act. 
11 8 
Under the PDA, as there 
is no such provision, there is a possibility of pre-emptive disclosures in accord 
with the Act being misused by senior employees and managers to avoid dismissal 
11 8 Protected Disclosures Act 199-l, s 18 (NSW) 
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or censure. 1f an organisation did dismiss or censure an employee in this 
situation, claiming that it was not because of the disclosure, but because of 
previous activities of the employee, apart from issues of evidence and proof, the 
PDA provides little protection for the employer. Section 17 provides that where 
an employee who makes a protected disclosure under the Act claims to have 
suffered retaliatory action from his or her employer or former employer, that 
employee has a right to personal grievances under the Employment Contract Act 
1991. The PDA does not expressly define "retaliatory action" and does not 
specifically provide that there has to be direct causative link between the 
disclosure and the "retaliatory action" . This may of course be implicit in the use 
of the word 'retaliatory" but increases the uncertainty of an employer' s rights in 
this situation . 
2. Illegal disclosures 
In the United Kingdom the PIDA clearly provides that if it is illegal for someone 
to make a disclosure, for instance if an employee has agreed to keep secret state 
and official information received as part of his or her position, then disclosure in 
accord with the PIDA will not qualify as a protected disclosure under that Act. 
This means that if someone discloses in this circumstance it would still be an 
offence. The PDA is silent on this issue, although it is clear that the PDA covers 
the armed forces and those that deal with intelligence and security matters 11 9 
Sections 12 to 14 set out special procedures for employees of intelligence and 
security agencies to disclose wrongdoings. Briefly such employees must 
disclose only to those persons with appropriate security clearance at the first 
level or at the second level to the Inspector-General oflntelligence and Security 
or the relevant Minister or Prime Minister. The general immunity given to a 
whistleblower under section 18 covers any criminal proceedings or disciplinary 
action and therefore a whistleblower who for example breaches the Armed 
Forces Discipline Act 1971 or the Intelligence and Security Committee Act I 996, 
11 9 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 3 states that phrase "intelligence and security agency" has 
the meaning given to it be section 2( 1) of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security Act 
1996, namely being the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. the Government 
Communications Security Bureau and any other agency declared by the Governor General to be 
an intelligence and security agency. 
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will be protected as long as the disclosure in accord with the sections of the PDA. 
3 Promotion <f the Act 
Under the Act, the Ombudsman is statutorily empowered to provide information 
and guidance to an employee who has or is considering making a protected 
disclosure.
120 
However the role of the Ombudsman is limited to providing 
information when an employee has approached that office seeking guidance. 
There is no community education role given to that office or any other body, 
which the writer submits is necessary to ensure that employees especially in 
private sector organisations are aware of the existence of procedures and 
protections of the Act. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 section 21 provides that the Minister of State 
Services, not sooner than 2 years after the commencement of the Act shall ensure 
a report be prepared on the operation of the Act and whether any amendments to 
the scope and operation of the Act are necessary or desirable . Paradoxically by 
2003 there may be very little evidence of the operation of the Act. For if 
organisations have implemented effective internal procedures as part of a holistic 
approach to establishing ethical business practices, then there may be very little 
evidence of whistleblowing to an external observer. Disclosures are dealt with 
effectively and confidentially inside an organisation, ensuring that a 
whistleblower has no cause or justification to disclose outside of the 
organisation. Alternatively if an organisations does not have effective internal 
procedures or indeed any procedures at all, then a employee who may be 
considering disclosing outside of an organisation may be unwilling to do so due 
to uncertainty as to the consequences. For if an employer is able to show some 
disagreement in the past as evidence of ill will that can be used to rebut the 
protection of the Act, that whistleblower may remain silent rather than risk any 
reprisals. 
120 Protected Disclosures Act 2000 s I 5. 
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In conclusion private sector concerns about the increased opportunity afforded by 
the legislation for embittered ex-employees to cause havoc against former private 
sector organisations were raised before the Select Committee. It remains unclear 
given the uncertainties in the Act and the jurisdictional issues whether the Act 
will increase the level of whistleblowing in such circumstances or indeed 
whether it will increase at all. Therefore the writer believes that although the Act 
may have some effect on public sector agencies, as they are required to comply 
with the Act, there needs to be a great deal of publicity to educate the private 
sector of the benefits of institutionalised whistleblowing. Until this is undertaken 
and the inherent problems with the Act are resolved, it is unlikely in the writer's 
opinion, that the underlying social objectives of the Act will be achieved. 
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